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Abstract
We experimentally study the effects of allotment – the division of an item into homo-
geneous units – in independent private value auctions. We compare a bundling first-price
auction with two equivalent treatments where allotment is implemented: a two-unit dis-
criminatory auction and two simultaneous single-unit first-price auctions. We find that
allotment in the form of a discriminatory auction generates a loss of efficiency with respect
to bundling. In the allotment treatments, we observe large and persistent bid spread, and
the discriminatory auction is less efficient than simultaneous auctions. We provide a uni-
fied interpretation of our results that is based on both a non-equilibrium response to the
coordination problem characterizing the simultaneous auction format and a general class
of behavioral preferences that also includes risk aversion, joy of winning and loser’s regret
as specific cases.
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1 Introduction
Multi-unit auctions – i.e., auctions in which several homogeneous units of the same good are
sold at one go – are becoming increasingly popular in a large variety of markets. Variants
of multi-unit auctions have long been used to trade electricity, treasury bills, public procure-
ment contracts; more recently, they are being adopted to allocate emission permits,1 and to
regulate renewable energy markets2 and many industrial purchasing relations, especially on
the internet.3
When multiple units of the same good are involved, the market designer has to be con-
cerned with two intimately related questions: (i) whether to sell the entire quantity as a single
bundle or allot it into several distinct units; (ii) in the latter case, which particular allotment
strategy to implement. Bundling units together can have obvious advantages for the auction-
eer, such as synergies in production, simplicity and lower administrative costs. On the other
hand, bidders will generally respond strategically to allotting if the value they attach to a
specific unit depends on the number of units already acquired (or expected to be acquired)
in the auction. This response will be sensitive to the allotment format chosen (see, among
others, Engelbrecht-Wiggans and Kahn 1998a and 1998b). In addition, allotment might also
foster entry by other (small) bidders, thus altering the degree of competition and behavior
by incumbents (see, e.g., Goeree et al. 2013). Therefore, allotting may generate composite
effects, that can vary widely depending on market structure and technological characteristics
regarding the production, transport and distribution of goods. But, if all such structural
and technological factors are properly controlled for, what effects, if any, does the exogenous
decision to bundle or allot the quantity of a divisible good exert on bidders’ behavior and
thereby on the outcome of the auction (efficiency and revenue)?
The present paper tackles this question reporting results from a novel and intuitive ex-
periment. In a nutshell, the experiment’s details are the following. Our design includes three
treatments. The first treatment corresponds to bundling and consists of a standard single-
unit, first-price, independent private value auction. The other two treatments implement
allotment in two different ways. In the second treatment, bidders compete in a two-unit dis-
criminatory auction: each bidder places two bids, the two highest bids are deemed winning
and the bidder(s) who placed the winning bids is (are) assigned the units and pays (pay)
the amount of her (their) winning bid(s). In the third treatment, bidders participate in two
simultaneous first-price auctions, each involving a single unit.
To single out the pure effect of the selling strategy chosen, we adopt the simplest possible
setting such that the three treatments, according to standard theory, should be equivalent
in terms of bidding behavior and efficiency: first, the units traded in the auctions do not
display any complementarity or substitutability, as then comparing single-unit against multi-
unit auctions would have to account for complex effects on bidders’ incentives. Second, we
keep constant the number of bidders and the distribution of private valuations to rule out the
possibility that allotment affects the degree of competition or the thickness of the demand.
1See Betz et al. (2010) for the Australian systems; Lopomo et al. (2011) for the mechanism options in USA;
Goeree et al. (2010) for an experimental investigation of the European Emission Trading System, the world’s
largest carbon trading market.
2For example, the number of countries that adopted renewable energy auctions increased from 9 in 2009 to
at least 44 by early 2013, out of which 30 were developing countries (IRENA 2013); as for European Union,
in 2013, 8 Member States result adopting renewable energy auctions (EC 2013).
3For business-to-business (B2B) multi-unit auctions, see Katok and Roth (2004).
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Although this setup is extremely stylized, it nevertheless mimics many real markets, most
evidently Treasury bill auctions and (other) primary offerings of stock and bonds. Moreover,
we believe that our benchmark case of units’ constant marginal values may have other existing
representations in the field. For example, providers of electricity often operate at ranges of
constant marginal cost in incomplete markets; a similar situation applies for “sales for re-sale”
transactions, as long as sales volume remains below capacity constraints.
Our experimental evidence highlights that allotment causes behavioral responses by bid-
ders that are not predicted by the standard theory. In particular, the main experimental
results can be summarized as follows. First, allotment in the form of a discriminatory auc-
tion generates an efficiency loss and a marginal decrease in revenue with respect to bundling.
Second, the allotment strategy is not neutral: even though, in both allotment formats, we
detect bid spread (i.e., different bids for the two units), running two simultaneous auctions
reduces inefficiency relative to the discriminatory auction. Third, in all treatments we observe
overbidding (i.e., bids above the theoretical risk neutral Nash equilibrium) but bids are less
aggressive in the discriminatory auction than in the other treatments.
The paper makes two contributions that are of particular interest. Our first contribution
is applied. Our results suggest that bidders may behave “as if” the marginal values of the
units were decreasing even though their intrinsic values appear to be constant. As shown
by us, this has an impact on efficiency that should point the choice of the market designer
toward bundling. When allotment has to be implemented, the simultaneous auctions format
is preferable: by requiring proper bid coordination between bidders, and in the absence of
elements that may facilitate successful coordination, simultaneous auctions may induce some
shaky bidders to refrain from the (inefficient) bid spread strategy; this produces a larger total
surplus relative to the discriminatory auction, where this coordination problem is absent.
Our second contribution consists in providing a description of our results in terms of a
general class of behavioral motives. Mechanism design maps a set of rules and assumptions
about bidders’ preferences to outputs. Most of the literature in this field simply assumes
risk neutrality. Our experiment provides clean evidence that this assumption does not match
the behavior of many bidders, and that the actual behavior is biased in a way that renders
bundling the favorable design choice, both in terms of efficiency and surplus to the auction-
eer. In line with recent advances in behavioral economics, we show that risk aversion, joy of
winning, and loser’s regret are all valid representations of preferences to explain our exper-
imental results. While our study does not aim at disentangling among these (and possible
other) behavioral explanations, in discussing our results we identify the general features that
they have in common: (i) bidders gain a benefit from winning the auction on top of the
assigned monetary values, and (ii) this benefit decreases with the number of units acquired.
The rest of the paper is organized as follows. Section 2 reviews the related literature.
Section 3 presents the experimental design and the theoretical predictions under the standard
assumption of risk neutral bidders. Section 4 reports the results of our experiment. Section
5 provides a unified explanation of our results in terms of general behavioral features also
discussing some existing hypothesis that meet these features. Finally, Section 6 concludes
with some policy implications from our experimental findings.4
4The experimental instructions, a formal analysis of the testable predictions and some additional empirical
results are provided in the Supplementary Material.
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2 Related Literature
Considering the existing economic literature on auctions involving multiple objects, this pa-
per adds a controlled investigation on the allotment effect per se. In so doing, we refer to
three main strands of literature. The first concerns the effects of bundling: Palfrey (1983)
theoretically shows that, with two bidders and in a second-price auction, allocating different
goods as a single bundle is revenue superior (but inferior in terms of total welfare) to selling
them through parallel auctions (see also Chakraborty 1999). Popkowski Leszczyc and Ha¨ubl
(2010) experimentally show that, when there is complementarity between goods, a bundle
auction generates higher revenue than two parallel auctions for the components of the bun-
dle; the opposite occurs when the goods are substitutes. Differently from these papers, we do
not introduce any complementarity/substitutability between goods in the aim to study the
“pure” effects that allotment exerts on bidders’ behavior. Moreover, we consider multi-unit
auctions in which bidders place multiple bids in the same auction and we extend the analysis
to ”pay-as-bid” pricing rules.
Second, we contribute to the literature on multi-unit auctions that investigates the prop-
erties of the standard formats (i.e., uniform price, discriminatory and Vickrey and their open
outcry counterparts). In particular, the theory on discriminatory auctions (Engelbrecht-
Wiggans and Kahn 1998b) has shown that, when the units have decreasing marginal valua-
tions, (i) bidders shade all bids and (ii) the difference between two bids placed by a bidder
tends to be smaller than the difference between the corresponding valuations. Experimental
analysis on multi-unit auctions (surveyed, e.g., by Kagel and Levin 2011 and Kwasnica and
Sherstyuk 2013) have mainly focused on uniform-price and Vickrey auctions, while less atten-
tion has been devoted to the discriminatory format. Some relevant exceptions are: Goeree et
al. (2013), who study preemptive bidding in discriminatory and ascending auctions in which
entry has a negative externality on incumbent bidders; Goswami et al. (1996) and Sade et
al. (2006), who investigate cooperative behavior in discriminatory and uniform-price common
value auctions with pre-play communication; Engelmann and Grimm (2009), who analyze
bidders’ behavior and efficiency in five different multi-unit auction formats (discriminatory,
uniform-price sealed-bid, uniform-price open, Vickrey and Ausubel auctions). Engelmann and
Grimm (2009) find a strong evidence of overbidding and bid spreading. In a companion paper
- Grimm and Engelmann (2005) - these authors advance risk aversion and joy of winning as
possible explanations for this puzzling evidence, finding empirical arguments that suggest the
superiority of the latter behavioral artifact. We share with Engelmann and Grimm (2009) the
same setting, and we depart from it as we assess the effects of allotment on bids and efficiency
in alternative pay-as-bid auction formats. To this end, we compare results from the discrimi-
natory auction with an equivalent (in value) single-unit first-price auction. Moreover, in order
to check whether results depend on the specific form of allotment, we also consider an ad-
ditional treatment in which bidders participate in two identical and simultaneous single-unit
first-price auctions.
Finally, our paper also relates to the literature on combinatorial auctions in which buyers
can submit bids on either single units or packages. Combinatorial auctions are useful alloca-
tion mechanisms when units are characterized by the presence of synergies or when, because
of their budget capacity and dimension, there are bidders interested in subsets of goods only
(Cramton et al. 2006). Kagel and Levin (2005), Katok and Roth (2004) and Chernomaz and
Levin (2012) investigate how the exposure problem - occurring when a bidder refrain from
aggressive bidding in order to avoid exposure to losses in case she wins only a limited number
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of units - affects efficiency and revenue of the auction. We share with this literature the atten-
tion to the effects of introducing the possibility of allotting items. However, the comparison
of our results with those from combinatorial auctions is not straightforward: indeed, in the
latter, package bids compete with single-item bids in the same auction, while in our study,
we compare an auction in which only package bids are allowed with two formats in which
bidders can exclusively place separate bids.
3 Experimental design and predictions
In order to assess how allotment affects bids and efficiency, we compare results from a bench-
mark treatment in which bidders compete for a single item with those observed in two equiv-
alent (in terms of experimental features and potential payoff) auction formats with multiple
and identical units. For each treatment, we ran three sessions. Each session included 15
periods and involved 18 participants, for a total of 162 subjects.
3.1 Treatments
The benchmark treatment, 1A1U, consists of a single-unit, first-price, independent private
value auction with two bidders. Once pairs are formed, each bidder privately observes the
value of an indivisible item. In each period, values are randomly and independently drawn
from the same uniform distribution with support [0, 200]. All the characteristics of the distri-
bution used to generate private values are common knowledge. After observing their values,
bidders simultaneously place their bids. The bidder who places the highest bid wins the item
and her earnings are given by the difference between her value and her bid. The other bidder
earns nothing.
In the second treatment, 1A2U, in every period the two bidders compete in a two-unit
discriminatory auction. To each bidder, the two units have the same value, which, in each pe-
riod, is randomly and independently drawn from a uniform distribution with support [0, 100].
This implies that the distribution (in terms of mean and upper and lower bounds) of the sum
of the private values in 1A2U coincides with that used in the benchmark, 1A1U. The rules of
the auction are as follows: given her value, each bidder places two bids. Once the four bids
are collected, the two units are assigned to the bidder(s) who placed the two highest bids.
For any unit acquired, the bidder earns an amount given by the difference between her value
and the corresponding winning bid. As in 1A1U, if a bidder does not obtain any unit, she
earns nothing.
In the third treatment, 2A1U, allotment is introduced by letting the two bidders partici-
pate in two identical and simultaneous first-price auctions, each involving a single unit. Apart
from this aspect, all other experimental features are identical to those adopted in 1A2U. Given
her value, each bidder places two bids, one in each auction. In each of the two auctions, the
highest bid wins the corresponding unit. Earnings are then computed as in 1A2U.
3.2 Procedures
Upon their arrival, subjects were randomly assigned to a computer terminal. In all sessions,
instructions were distributed at the beginning of the experiment and read aloud. Before the
experiment started, subjects were asked to answer a number of control questions to make
sure that they understood the instructions as well as the consequences of their choices. When
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necessary, answers to the questions were privately checked and explained. At the beginning of
the experiment, the computer randomly formed three rematching groups of six subjects each.
The composition of the rematching groups was kept constant throughout the session. At
the beginning of every period, subjects were randomly and anonymously divided into pairs.
Pairs were randomly formed in every period within rematching groups. Subjects were told
that pairs were randomly formed in such a way that they would never interact with the same
opponent in two consecutive periods.5
In every period, subjects were presented with two consecutive screens. On the first screen,
subjects were informed about their private value and were required to place their bids (one
in 1A1U, two in 1A2U and 2A1U ). On the second screen, each subject was informed about
the winning bid(s) as well as her payoff in that period. Payoffs were expressed in points and
accumulated over periods. Subjects started the experiment with a balance of 300 points to
cover the possibility of losses. At the end of the experiment, the number of points obtained by
a subject during the experiment was converted at an exchange rate of 3 euro per 100 points
and monetary earnings were paid in cash privately.
The experiment took place at the Experimental Laboratory of the University of Inns-
bruck in November 2011. Participants were mainly undergraduate students, recruited by
using ORSEE (Greiner 2004). The experiment was computerized using the z-Tree software
(Fischbacher 2007). On average, subjects earned 12.00 Euro in sessions lasting 45 minutes
(including the time for instructions and payment). Before leaving the laboratory, subjects
completed a short questionnaire containing questions on their socio-demographics and their
perception of the experimental task.
3.3 Testable predictions: bids, spread and efficiency
In order to derive testable predictions on bidding behavior and efficiency in the three treat-
ments, we develop a simple theoretical framework based on the assumption of risk neutral
bidders with standard preferences. Although a systematic violation of risk neutrality has been
extensively documented by the economic literature, it still constitutes the standard assump-
tion in models studying the equilibrium properties of different auction formats. Moreover,
as discussed in the next pages, the assumption of risk neutrality provides two very intu-
itive predictions in our experiment, namely equivalence (in terms of bids, total efficiency and
auctioneer’s revenue) across auction formats, and identical bids in the allotment treatments,
1A2U and 2A1U.
In 1A1U, the item auctioned off has a value Vi for bidder i. Values are private information,
but it is commonly known that they are i.i.d. random variables with uniform distribution over
the interval [0, V¯ ]. After observing her own value, bidder i places her bid, ai. The item is
assigned to the bidder who places the highest bid and the winner pays her bid. Bidder i’s
payoff is Vi − ai if she wins the auction and zero otherwise.
In the allotment treatments, 1A2U and 2A1U, the two bidders compete for two units: in
1A2U, the two units are sold in the same auction; in 2A1U, they are sold separately, in two
identical and simultaneous auctions. In both cases, the two units have the same value, vi,
5Our rematching protocol implies that, given the size of the sub-groups (six subjects), on average subjects
interacted with the same opponent every 5 periods. Clearly, this is not a perfect stranger design; nevertheless,
the protocol leaves very little room for developing bidding strategies over multiple periods. The rematching
protocol was intended to increase the number of independent observations and perform non parametric tests
to check for robustness of the main parametric results.
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to bidder i. Values are private information, but it is commonly known that they are i.i.d.
random variables with uniform distribution over the interval [0, v¯ = V¯ /2]. Therefore, the sum
of the values of the two units, 2vi, is uniformly distributed over the interval [0, V¯ ], just like
Vi in 1A1U.
In 1A2U, bidder i places two bids, bi,1 and bi,2, with bi,1 ≥ bi,2 (i.e. bi,1 and bi,2 are the
highest and lowest bids of bidder i, respectively). Four bids are thus collected within a pair,
the two highest bids win and are paid by the corresponding bidder(s). Bidder i’s payoff is
2vi − bi,1 − bi,2 if she wins both units, vi − bi,1 if she wins only one unit, and zero otherwise.
Notice that bi,1, the bidder i’s high bid, competes with bj,2, the bidder j’s low bid. Bidder i
wins her first unit if and only if only bi,1 > bj,2; she also obtains a second unit if and only if
bi,2 > bj,1.
In 2A1U, bidder i places one bid, ci,1, in the first auction and one bid, ci,2, in the second.
In each auction, the highest bid wins the unit and the corresponding bidder pays it. If bidder
i wins both auctions, her payoff is thus 2vi− ci,1− ci,2; if she wins only the first (respectively,
second) auction, her payoff is vi − ci,1 (respectively, vi − ci,2); if she wins neither auction, her
payoff is zero.
Under the assumption of risk neutral bidders, each of the three treatments admits a unique
symmetric (Bayes-)Nash equilibrium in pure strategies, which implies the following testable
predictions:
H1. Efficiency and revenue equivalence. In all treatments, the units are allocated to
the bidder with the highest private value. Thus, on average, the overall surplus is the
same across treatments. Finally, in every treatment, the expected overall surplus is split
equally between bidders and the auctioneer.
H2. Bid equivalence. In all treatments, bids are equal to half the value assigned to that
unit. Thus, for given private value, bids in 1A1U are equal to the sum of the two bids
in 1A2U and 2A1U.
H3. Zero-spread. In 1A2U and 2A1U, bidders place two identical bids for the two units.
4 Experimental results
We organize our results as follows. First, we investigate differences across treatments in
overall efficiency, bidders’ surplus and auctioneer’s revenue. Second, we compare treatments
with respect to the extent of overbidding by looking at both the (sum of the) bids and the
proportion of subjects that bid above the risk neutral (RN ) equilibrium level. Third, focusing
on the two treatments with allotment, 1A2U and 2A1U, we study bid spreading.
The non parametric tests discussed below are based on 27 independent observations (9
rematching groups per treatment). Similarly, the parametric models presented in the next
subsections properly control for dependency of observations over repetitions by either cluster-
ing standard errors or introducing random effects at the rematching group level. Moreover,
in order to check the robustness of our main findings to repetition effects, we replicated the
parametric analysis on different subsets of 5 periods: both the sign and the magnitude of the
treatment dummies remain stable across subsets of periods.6
6Results of these robustness checks are available upon request.
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4.1 Efficiency and revenue
Our first result concerns the effects of allotment on the outcome of the auction in terms of
total surplus and how this surplus is split between the auctioneer and the bidders.
To investigate this issue, for each pair and in every period, we construct three measures:
(i) the relative efficiency, defined as the ratio between the achieved total surplus and the
maximum possible surplus; (ii) the relative auctioneer’s revenue, given by the ratio between
the winning bid(s) and the maximum possible welfare; (iii) the relative bidders’ surplus,
corresponding to the ratio between the monetary payoff(s) of the winning bidder(s) and the
maximum possible surplus. As shown in the previous section, under the assumption of risk
neutrality, we should observe no differences in these three measures across treatments.
Table 1 shows summary statistics for the three measures in the three treatments.
[Table 1 about here]
We observe a loss of (relative) efficiency in all treatments, with this effect being more
pronounced in 1A2U. Indeed, relative efficiency is similar in 1A1U (0.979) and in 2A1U
(0.975), while it appears lower in 1A2U (0.957). The efficiency loss in 1A2U is associated
with a reduction in the relative auctioneer’s revenue (0.700 in 1A2U, 0.716 in 2A1U and 0.737
in 1A1U ), while no appreciable differences in bidders’ surplus are detected across treatments.
Table 2 reports estimates from GLS random effects models to compare relative efficiency,
relative auctioneer’s revenue, and relative bidders’ surplus in the three treatments, computed
by averaging at the rematching group level.
[Table 2 about here]
In line with our preliminary observations, the first column of Table 2 shows that relative
efficiency is significantly higher in 1A1U than in the two allotment treatments, but the
second column clarifies that this difference has to be ascribed to the discriminatory auction:
relative efficiency is significantly lower in 1A2U than in 1A1U, while no significant difference
is recorded between the 1A1U and 2A1U. The difference in relative efficiency between 1A2U
and 2A1U is highly significant (χ2(1) = 8.19, p < 0.01).7 Column (2) also shows that the
welfare loss is significant in all treatments. The relative efficiency in 1A1U (as measured by
the constant term) is significantly smaller than one (χ2(1) = 28.43, p < 0.01). Similarly, the
measures of relative efficiency in 1A2U and 2A1U – expressed by the linear combination of
the constant term with the corresponding treatment dummy – are significantly lower than
one (in 1A2U : χ2(1) = 79.58, p < 0.01; in 2A1U : χ2(1) = 35.95, p < 0.01). The loss in
efficiency in all treatments is due to allocative inefficiency: the percentage of winning bids
placed by subjects with the lowest private value is 10.67% in 1A1U, 29.85% in 1A2U, and
18.04% in 2A1U.
Moving to the relative auctioneer’s revenue, we do not find significant differences between
1A1U and the two allotment treatments (column (3)). However, when we replace the al-
lotment dummy, 1A2U &2A1U, with two separate treatment dummies, we find both have
7In line with these findings, a (two-sided) Mann-Whitney rank-sum test rejects the null hypothesis that
the relative efficiency in 1A1U is the same as that in the two allotment treatments (z = 2.057, p < 0.05).
Similarly, the test detects a significant difference in relative efficiency between 1A2U and 2A1U (z = −2.693,
p < 0.01) as well as between 1A1U and 1A2U (z = 2.517, p < 0.05). No significant differences are observed
between 1A1U and 2A1U (z = 1.015, p = 0.310).
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a negative coefficient, but only that of 1A2U is significant (column (4)).8 No statistical
difference is detected between 2A1U and 1A1U as well as between 2A1U and 1A2U.
We find no significant differences in terms of relative bidders’ surplus across treatments,
either in the regressions (both the coefficients of 1A2U and 2A1U in column (6) as well as
the estimate of 1A2U &2A1U in column (5) are not significant; the difference between the
coefficients of 1A2U and 2A1U in column (6) is not significant: χ2(1) = 0.00, p = 0.992), or
by using non parametric tests (according to a two-sided Mann-Whitney rank-sum test, the
difference in the relative bidders’ surplus between 1A1U and the treatments with allotment
is not significant: z = −0.463, p = 0.643; similarly, the difference between 1A2U and 2A1U
is not significant: z = 0.044, p = 0.965).
Finally, because of overbidding (see next subsection), in all treatments the relative auc-
tioneer’s revenue is greater than the relative bidders’ surplus: the null hypothesis that they
are equal is always rejected by a (two-sided) Wilcoxon signed-rank test (z = 2.667, p < 0.01).
R1. Differences in efficiency and revenue. (i) While we observe allocative inefficiency
in all treatments, efficiency is higher in 1A1U and 2A1U than in 1A2U. (ii) The auc-
tioneer’s revenue is higher in 1A1U than in 1A2U. (iii) Treatments do not significantly
differ in terms of bidders’ surplus. (iv) In all treatments the auctioneer’s revenue is
higher than the bidders’ surplus.
4.2 Overbidding
Figure 1 shows scatterplots of all submitted bids in all periods in the three treatments (for
the allotment treatments, the sum of the two bids is reported). The dashed line denotes the
theoretical RN Nash equilibrium level of (the sum of) the bid(s), while the solid line is the
45° line (bid = value).
[Figure 1 about here]
We observe overbidding in all treatments. In particular, the proportion of bids above the
RN level is 89.14% in 1A1U, 79.38% in 1A2U, and 83.46% in 2A1U. A (two-sided) Mann-
Whitney rank-sum test rejects the null hypothesis that the average number of periods in which
a subject overbids in 1A1U is the same as in the two treatments with allotments (z = 2.160,
p < 0.05). The previous finding is mainly driven by the comparison between 1A1U and
1A2U (z = 2.075, p < 0.05), whereas the difference between the benchmark and 2A1U is not
significant (z = 1.634, p = 0.102).
Table 3 reports the probit marginal effect estimates for the probability of overbidding in
the three treatments.
[Table 3 about here]
As shown in column (4), allotment reduces the probability of overbidding. Indeed, the coef-
ficient of 1A2U &2A1U is negative and highly significant. Column (5) reveals that, compared
with 1A1U, the probability of overbidding in 1A2U is significantly lower. The treatment effect
remains negative, although not significant (according to a two-sided test) in 2A1U. Finally,
8A (two-sided) Mann-Whitney rank-sum test confirms this result as it rejects the null hypothesis that the
relative auctioneer’s revenues in 1A1U and 1A2U are equal (z = 1.810, p = 0.070).
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the difference between the coefficients of 1A2U and 2A1U is not significant (χ2(1) = 1.57,
p = 0.210).
Moving to the magnitude of overbidding, Table 4 reports results from parametric panel
regressions to study the determinants of the (sum of the) bids in the three treatments.
[Table 4 about here]
By looking at the first three columns of Table 4, the coefficient of Value is significantly
greater than 0.5 in 1A1U (χ2(1) = 422.73, p < 0.01), in 1A2U (χ2(1) = 166.89, p < 0.01)
and in 2A1U (χ2(1) = 317.41, p < 0.01).9 As indicated by the coefficient of 1A2U &2A1U
in column (4), after controlling for the private value and the linear time trend, allotment
significantly decreases the (sum of the) bids. Moreover, when we replace 1A2U &2A1U with
two distinct treatment dummies, we find that both 1A2U and 2A1U have the same sign,
although (according to a two-sided test) it is significant in 1A2U only. The difference between
the coefficients of 1A2U and 2A1U in column (5) is not significant (χ2(1) = 0.38, p = 0.539).10
As a final observation, the (sum of the) bids significantly decrease(s) over periods as indicated
by the coefficient of Period.11 We summarize the previous findings as follows.
R2. Overbidding. (i) In all treatments, subjects bid above the RN equilibrium level. (ii)
Bids in 1A1U are greater than the sum of the two bids in 1A2U and 2A1U. This effect
is stronger when 1A1U is compared with 1A2U.
The above parametric results are robust to different specifications of the econometric
model. In particular, results (available upon request) from a Tobit regression (with standard
errors clustered at the rematching group level) confirm sign and magnitude of the coefficients
reported in Table 4.
4.3 Bid spread in 1A2U and 2A1U
In contrast with what is predicted by risk neutrality, we find that 84.32% and 75.31% of
bids in 1A2U and 2A1U, respectively, display bid spread. Figure 2 illustrates the difference
between bids per value in 1A2U and 2A1U.
[Figure 2 about here]
Over all periods, relative to the RN level, the magnitude of bid spread is 30.33% in
1A2U and 29.57% in 2A1U. In both treatments, the relative spread is significantly greater
than 0 according to a (two-sided) Wilcoxon signed-rank test (in both treatments, z = 2.667,
p < 0.01). Moreover, the relative spread exceeds 40% in 29.88% and 30.00% of the offers
9This result is confirmed by a (two-sided) Wilcoxon signed-rank test, which rejects the null hypothesis that
bids are equal to the RN level in the three treatments (z = 2.666, p < 0.01).
10In line with the previous results, a (two-sided) Mann-Whitney rank-sum test strongly rejects the null
hypothesis that the average bid in 1A1U is the same as in the allotment treatments (z = 2.160, p = 0.031).
Again, the negative effect of allotment on bids is stronger when 1A1U is compared to 1A2U (z = 2.075,
p = 0.038), rather than when it is compared to 2A1U (z = 1.634, p = 0.102 for the two-sided test). We do
not find any significant difference between 1A2U and 2A1U (z = −0.574, p = 0.566).
11In order to disentangle the intercepts from the effects of repetition, we imposed the linear trend to start
from 0 in the first period.
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made in 1A2U and 2A1U, respectively. Finally, as Figure 2 makes it clear, the size of the
bid spread increases with the bidder’s value.
In Table 5, we parametrically investigate the determinants of both the size and the prob-
ability of bid spread in the two allotment treatments.
[Table 5 about here]
There is a positive and highly significant correlation between the size of bid spread and the
bidder’s private value. Interestingly, as shown by the coefficient of Period in columns (1), (3)
and (5), the size of bid spread either remains stable or increases over periods. This confirms
that rather than converging to the level predicted under the assumption of risk neutrality,
subjects persistently and intentionally choose to place different bids. As indicated by the
coefficient of 2A1U in column (5), we do not observe significant differences in the size of
bid spread between 1A2U and 2A1U.12 By looking at the probit marginal effect estimates in
columns (2), (4) and (6), we find that the probability of bid spread positively depends on the
assigned value and increases over periods. Finally, column (6) shows that bid spread is more
likely to occur in 1A2U than in 2A1U.
R3. Bid spread. (i) In the allotment treatments, 1A2U and 2A1U, we observe a persistent
and large-in-size bid spread. The size of bid spread is the same in the two treatments.
(ii) The probability of bid spread is higher in 1A2U than in 2A1U.
Given the results about overbidding and bid spread, in Table 6 we look at the size of the
two bids in the allotment treatments.
[Table 6 about here]
Both the highest and the lowest bids observed in 1A2U and 2A1U are associated with
overbidding. The coefficient of Value in columns (1)-(4) is always significantly greater than
0.5 (for the highest bid: χ2(1) = 372.00, p < 0.01 in 1A2U ; χ2(1) = 610.64, p < 0.01 in
2A1U ; for the lowest bid: χ2(1) = 30.39, p < 0.01 in 1A2U ; χ2(1) = 77.52, p < 0.01 in
2A1U ). A (two-sided) Wilcoxon signed-rank test rejects the null hypothesis that the two bids
in both treatments are equal to the RN level (for the highest and lowest bids in 1A2U as
well the highest bid in 2A1U : z = 2.667, p < 0.01; for the lowest bid in 2A1U : z = 2.547,
p = 0.011). Moreover, by looking at columns (5) and (6), we do not find any significant
difference between treatments in both the highest and the lowest bids.
The coefficients of Value in the regressions reported in Table 6 account for the differences
in overall bids across auction formats (result R2 ). Indeed, while the coefficients of Value
in the regressions based on the highest bids in 1A2U and 2A1U (columns (1) and (3)) are
similar in magnitude to those attached to Value in 1A1U (see Table 4, column (1)), the
corresponding coefficients in the regressions based on the lowest bids (columns (2) and (4))
are substantially smaller. In other words, in the allotment treatments, subjects make two
different bids, both greater than those under risk neutrality; moreover, relative to the value
12This result is confirmed by non parametric tests: a (two-sided) Mann-Whitney rank-sum test does not
reject the null hypothesis that bid spread in 1A2U is the same as in 2A1U (z = 0.751, p = 453).
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of the unit, the size of overbidding associated with the highest bid is similar to that observed
in 1A1U, while the size of overbidding associated with the lowest bid is significantly smaller.13
Again, the previous results are robust to different specifications of the econometric model.
In particular, Tobit regressions (with standard errors clustered at the rematching group level)
produce estimates that are equivalent to those reported in Table 6.
The finding that subjects in 1A2U overbid with both bids represents a remarkable differ-
ence with the results of Engelmann and Grimm (2009): in a discriminatory auction similar to
our 1A2U, they find that the lowest bid is, on average, below the RN level (underbidding).
This discrepancy in results can be due to the different (re)matching protocol used in the two
experiments. While the partner matching used in Engelmann and Grimm (2009) can induce
subjects to collude over periods and thus to lower bids, the random rematching protocol
implemented in our experiment makes collusion (virtually) impossible.
It might be argued that differences in bidding behavior across treatments are due to the
fact that 1A2U and 2A1U impose an extra cognitive load,14 as they require subjects to make
an additional bid relative to 1A1U. We formally investigate this issue by using information
on the response time spent by subjects to make their choices in each period. In particular,
we follow a two-step analysis. First, we parametrically assess the existence of differences in
response times across treatments. In this respect, following the same econometric strategy as
in Table 4, we regress time response on the treatment dummies and a linear time trend. We
find that time responses are significantly lower in 1A1U than in the other two treatments.
Moreover, when focusing on the allotment treatments, time responses are higher in 1A2U
than in 2A1U. This evidence is in line with the idea that choosing bids is more complex in the
allotment treatments than in 1A1U. Second, we replicate the parametric analysis of Tables
3-5 on pooled data by including the time response as additional determinant of the (sum
of the) bids and bid spread. We find that both the size and the probability of bid spread
are significantly and positively associated with the response time. Thus, in the allotment
treatments, calibrating two different bids requires significantly more time than choosing the
same bid for the two units. Nevertheless, the inclusion of the response times as additional
determinant of the bidding behavior leaves the coefficients of the treatment dummies virtually
unchanged.15
13We run two additional panel regressions (with clustered standard errors). The dependent variable in the
first (second) regression is equal to the unique bid in 1A1U and to the highest (lowest) bid in the two allotment
treatments, 1A2U and 2A1U. As controls, both regressions include the allotment dummy, 1A2U&2A1U, the
value of one item and the time trend. The estimate of 1A2U&2A1U is not significant in the first regression,
while it is negative and significant at the 1% level in the second regression.
14See Rubinstein (2007) and Piovesan and Wengstro¨m (2009) for references on the relationship between
response times and economic behaviors.
15In an effort to reduce overbidding and bid spread, bidders could be given the option to reconsider their
bids in a second stage (see, for instance, Gu¨th et al. 2003, and Porter et al. 2003, for experiments introducing
the reconsider option in different contexts). We thank an anonymous referee for addressing this issue. From
what we have seen in our analysis, it is not clear whether such an option would be effective. First, our results
suggest that cognitive costs are not able to account for the observed treatment effects (see our analysis regarding
response time in the Supplementary Material). Second, as mentioned in the paper, we find no indication of
learning, as overbidding and bid spread are very similar in early and late periods of the experiment.
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5 Discussion
The experimental evidence analyzed in the previous section and summarized by results R1-R3
clearly contrasts the theoretical predictions derived from the standard model of Nash Equilib-
rium with risk neutral bidders (see subsection 3.3). What alternative behavioral assumptions
are needed to rationalize our evidence? It turns out that it is possible to accommodate all of
our experimental results by extending the standard model in three respects:
(A1) bidders’ preferences are such that the ratio between the marginal benefit of a higher bid
and its marginal cost is, ceteris paribus, greater than under risk neutrality;
(A2) bidders’ preferences are such that, in the allotment treatments, for equal bids, the
marginal utility from winning is strictly decreasing in successive units;
(A3) when an auction has a unique Nash Equilibrium, bidders play their equilibrium strate-
gies; when, instead, an auction has multiple Nash Equilibria, two types of behaviors are
possible: (i) either a bidder adopts an equilibrium strategy (“equilibrium” bidding), or
(ii) a bidder believes that the opponent is going to play any of her equilibrium strategies
with equal probability and best responds to this belief (“shaky” bidding).
The first two assumptions concern bidders’ preferences. The third assumption allows a
small departure from equilibrium reasoning when a multiplicity of equilibria exists; as will be
discussed later, this departure seems particularly reasonable when coordination is difficult.
Let us first analyze the implications of assumptions (A1) and (A2) on Nash Equilibrium
bids. It is straightforward to see that, in equilibrium, assumption (A1) generates overbidding
(result R2, point (i)): equilibrium bids under risk neutrality are such that the ratio between
marginal benefit and marginal cost of a higher bid equals one; now, if this ratio is actually
greater than one, each bidder will find it worthwhile to bid more aggressively, i.e. to overbid.
Given that, under risk neutrality, overall surplus is maximized and is split equally between
bidders and the auctioneer, overbidding has the obvious consequence that, in equilibrium,
revenue will be higher than bidders’ surplus (result R1, point (iv)).
Assumption (A2) implies bid spread in the allotment treatments (result R3, point (i)). To
see this, consider 1A2U first: notice that, in this treatment, if a bidder makes two different
bids, her low bid can be winning only if her high bid is winning as well. Therefore, the low
bid is intended to win a second additional unit; now, if assumption (A2) holds, this second
additional unit has lower marginal benefit than the first; hence, it is optimal to bid less for it.
Consider, now, 2A1U : it can be shown that, if one bidder places a high bid in the first auction
and a low in the second, the opponent will find it optimal to do the opposite; but then, the
high bid of one bidder will compete with the low bid of the other, which is exactly what
happens in 1A2U. As a consequence, equilibrium bids will be the same in the two treatments
with allotment; hence, bidders will make bid spread also in 2A1U and bid spread will be
equal in the two treatments.
Bid spread also explains why efficiency is lower in 1A2U than in 1A1U (result R1, point
(i)): in fact, because of bid spread, it is possible that the high bid placed by the bidder with
the lowest private value exceeds the low bid of the bidder with the highest private value; in
this case, an inefficient allocation will be realized; this is clearly not possible in 1A1U, where,
given that equilibrium bids are increasing, the winner will always be the bidder with highest
private value.
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The fact that, in the allotment treatments, bidders make bid spread destroys the equiv-
alence between 1A1U on the one hand and the treatments with allotment on the other. In
particular, bids in 1A1U are, on average, greater than the sum of the two bids in the al-
lotment treatments (result R2, point (ii)). The intuition is that, under assumption (A2),
allotment reduces competition between bidders, very much like unbundling for a monopolist
reduces competition across consumers when their willingness to pay for the goods are neg-
atively correlated. This is because in the allotment treatments, the high bid of one bidder,
which is intended to get the first unit with a larger marginal benefit, competes with the low
bid of the other, which is intended to get the second unit with a smaller marginal benefits.
As a consequence, a high bid that is less aggressive would still give a satisfactory probability
of winning the (highly valuable) first unit. This anticompetitive effect is absent in 1A1U.
Result R2, point (ii) has the obvious implication that the revenue in 1A1U will be higher
than in 1A2U (result R1, point (ii)).
As explained above, under assumptions (A1) and (A2), 1A2U and 2A1U should be equiv-
alent in equilibrium in terms of bids (and bid spread), revenue and efficiency. However, our
experimental results indicate that 1A2U and 2A1U are not fully equivalent in two respects:
first, even though there is no statistical difference in the size of bid spread, the probability of
bid spread is lower in 2A1U (result R3, point (ii)); second, efficiency is higher in 2A1U than
in 1A2U (result R1, point (i)).
By adding assumption (A3), the observed discrepancies between 1A2U and 2A1U can be
rationalized. Notice that, while 1A1U and 1A2U have a unique Nash Equilibrium, in 2A1U
two specular Nash Equilibria exist: one in which the first bidder places a high bid in the first
auction and a low bid in the second, and the second bidder makes the opposite; one in which
the first bidder places a low bid in the first auction and a high bid in the second, and the
second bidder makes the opposite. In other words, bidders have to properly coordinate their
bids on one of the two equilibria in a way that, in each auction, the high bid of one bidder
competes with the low bid of the other. Assumption (A3) states that, in a situation like this,
bidders do not necessarily try to coordinate on one of the equilibria. Rather, shaky bidding
is also possible: a shaky bidder is one who believes that there is equal probability that the
opponent will play one or the other of her two equilibrium strategies; stated elsewhere, a
shaky bidder believes that the opponent is indeed going to play a mixed strategy, in which
the pure equilibrium strategies “high bid in the first auction, low bid in the second” and “low
bid in the first auction, high bid in the second” are played with equal probabilities. It turns
out that the rational response to such a belief is to place the same bid in the two auctions
(zero-spread): this common bid will clearly be intermediate between the high and the low
bids of the opponent. Hence, the fact that we observe a lower probability of bid spread in
2A1U than in 1A2U (result R3, point (ii)) may be ascribed to the presence in our sample of
a (limited but) significant fraction of shaky bidders who respond to the coordination problem
in 2A1U by placing two identical bids.16
16It is worth emphasizing that shaky bidding behavior in 2A1U explains the non-equivalence between 1A2U
and 2A1U in terms of probability of bid spread, not the mere fact that we observe a fraction of zero-spread
bids in 2A1U. In fact, a limited number of zero-spread bids in 2A1U (and in 1A2U ) is still compatible with
Nash Equilibrium. Notice that the claim that, under (A2), Nash Equilibrium bids in 1A2U and 2A1U are
always characterized by bid spread, holds only when the strategy space is continuous. In a setting like ours,
where the space of admissible bids is discrete, equilibrium bids can display zero-spread for low types. In fact,
consider a bidder with a very low valuation: in a continuous domain, this bidder will find it optimal to make
a positive but small bid spread; but in a discrete domain, this bidder is artificially forced either to make a
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The coordination problem in 2A1U and the shaky bidding behavior that this coordination
problem might trigger, can also explain the observed difference between 1A2U and 2A1U in
terms of efficiency (result R1, point (i)). To see this, notice that an inefficient allocation
emerges whenever the two units are split between the two bidders; this potential situation
is magnified in equilibrium, as the high bid of one bidder competes with the low bid of the
other. In 2A1U, however, the possibility that either two equilibrium bidders fail to coordinate
(placing their high bids in the same auction) or an equilibrium bidder faces a shaky bidder
(who places one common intermediate bid in the two auctions) reduces the probability of an
inefficient outcome to emerge. Therefore, the higher efficiency of 2A1U relative to 1A2U may
be a direct or indirect consequence of the coordination problem in the former treatment.
Finally, it has to be noticed that, according to our experimental results, while we find
the auctioneer’s revenue to be higher in 1A1U than in 1A2U, the level in 2A1U seems to be
in between (although the difference between the treatments is not statistically significant).
Shaky bidding behavior could also explain this result. The optimal common bid placed by
a shaky bidder in 2A1U, which is intermediate between the high and the low bid of an
equilibrium bidder, will be larger than the average of the two bids. To see this, consider a
shaky bidder with a low private value: this bidder will not find it worthwhile to effectively
compete with the high bid of the opponent (wherever it is placed), as it would require bidding
too aggressively. Hence, this bidder competes only against her opponent’s low bid. But the
best response to the (equilibrium) low bid of the opponent is essentially a high (equilibrium)
bid. Now consider a shaky bidder with a high private value: by placing a bid which is
intermediate between the high and low bids, this bidder will have a large (but less than one)
probability of winning one unit and a much lower probability of winning both; however, a
relatively small increase of her common bid is sufficient to make this bidder win both units.
This option would be profitable if the marginal utility from winning the second unit is not
too small relative to the marginal utility of winning the first. Therefore, the common bid
by the shaky bidder will be closer to the high than to the low bid of the equilibrium bidder;
consequently, when a shaky bidder faces an equilibrium bidder, the expected revenue will
be larger than when two equilibrium bidders meet. This would explain why the revenue in
2A1U, where the presence of shaky bidders is significant, may be larger than in 1A2U.
The experimental evidence supports the hypothesis of shaky bidding behavior as a possible
explanation of the difference in efficiency and revenue between 1A2U and 2A1U. First, the
first two columns of Table 7 show that bid spread behavior significantly reduces the sum
of the bids in 2A1U (but not in 1A2U ). This confirms the fact that, in 2A1U, equilibrium
bidders (who make bid spread) bid on average less than shaky bidders (who place the same
bid in the two auctions).
[Table 7 about here]
Second, column (3) of Table 7 shows that the (average) spread reduces the auctioneer’s
revenue and accounts for the difference between 1A2U and 1A1U detected in Table 2. Finally,
as shown by the last column of Table 7, controlling for the (average) spread in the two
treatments with allotment also accounts for the difference in relative efficiency observed in
large bid spread or to make no spread at all, and may opt for the latter. Table 5 confirms that the probability
of making zero-spread bids is larger for low valuation bidders. In other words, bid spread signals equilibrium
behavior; zero-spread, instead, is consistent both with equilibrium (but only for low valuation bidders) and
with shaky bidding behavior.
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Table 2 across 1A1U, 1A2U and 2A1U (after controlling for the spread, the difference in
relative efficiency between 1A2U and 2A1U is not significant, χ2(1) = 0.11, p = 0.739).
Having showed that assumptions (A1)-(A3) are able to rationalize our experimental find-
ings, we finally discuss how reasonable and realistic these assumptions are.
Assumption (A3) admits the possibility that a bidder responds to the coordination prob-
lem arising from the presence of multiple equilibria by believing that the opponent is going to
play any of her two equilibrium strategies with the same probability. This behavioral hypoth-
esis seems particularly sensible in games in which no element exists that may help bidders
coordinate successfully, which is exactly the case in our 2A1U auction. Notice that tradi-
tional payoff-based equilibrium selection criteria like Pareto dominance and risk dominance
(see Harsanyi and Selten 1988) are not applicable in our context: in fact, the two equilibria
in 2A1U are characterized by identical payoffs and also deviation costs from one or the other
equilibrium are symmetric. In addition, non-payoff-based equilibrium selection criteria do not
apply here: there is no reason why one equilibrium of 2A1U should be more focal than the
other. Besides that, the absence of prior communication and the stranger rematching proto-
col prevents bidders’ expectations from converging on one particular equilibrium. Therefore,
given the absence of elements that may facilitate successful coordination on one equilibrium
or the other, it seems reasonable that a bidder may refrain from trying to coordinate on one
particular equilibrium and opt for the strategy that gives her the largest payoff on average,
should the other bidder play one or the other of her equilibrium strategies.17
To substantiate the intuition behind assumption (A3), we analyze shaky bidding behavior
in 2A1U in greater detail. Recall that, while bid spread signals equilibrium behavior, zero-
spread is consistent both with equilibrium (but only for low valuation bidders) and with
shaky bidding behavior. The first thing to observe is that, in our experiment, a typical
bidder places two equal bids in some periods and makes bid spread in others. Indeed, no
subject in our experiment placed two equal bids in all 15 periods. On the other hand, the
large majority of subjects (78%) did place two equal bids in at least one period. In light of
this, one question naturally arises: is there anything in the game that affects the decision of
an individual to turn from bid spread to zero-spread bids? The idea behind assumption (A3)
is that a shaky bidder is one who intentionally decides to place two equal bids in order to
avoid the risk of a coordination failure. Therefore, this type of behavior should arguably arise
especially when a bidder has just experienced the negative consequences (in terms of payoffs)
of a mis-coordination.
[Table 8 about here]
Table 8 shows that this intuition appears correct. Columns (1) and (3) focus on those
bidders who placed two equal bids in at least 7 out of 15 periods: these are bidders who
are likely to be shaky bidders, having chosen the zero-spread strategy with high frequency.
Now, the first column shows that the probability of switching from bid spread in one period
17The idea behind shaky bidding is thus close to the one behind the concepts of risk dominance. However,
while risk dominance is an equilibrium selection criterion, i.e., a player adopts this criterion to choose among
her equilibrium strategies, shaky bidding behavior applies to all the strategies of a player, including strategies
that are not part of any Nash Equilibrium. Hence, shaky bidding is a non-equilibrium choice model, similar in
spirit to a level-k thinking model (see, e.g., Nagel 1995): in fact, a shaky bidder can be thought of as a level-1
bidder who picks the strategy that is the best response to a (level-0) bidder who randomizes only over bids
that are part of a Nash Equilibrium. In the Supplementary Material, we provide a simple 3 × 3 example to
illustrate the workings of the shaky bidding assumption as opposed to traditional equilibrium selection criteria.
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to zero-spread in the next increases significantly immediately after a coordination failure:
the coefficient of Mis-coord(t-1) is positive and significant at the 0.01 level. Interestingly, as
revealed by the third column, this effect is mainly driven by those bidders who, because of
mis-coordination, lost both items in the previous period. In fact, when we split Mis-coord(t-1)
in two distinct variables, Mis-coord(t-1)*lost both and Mis-coord(t-1)*won at least one, only
the coefficient of the former is positive and highly significant (p < 0.01). This suggests that
a bidder will typically turn from equilibrium behavior (bid spread) to shaky bidding (zero-
spread) behavior when she experiences the negative consequences of mis-coordination on her
payoffs (losing units that could have been obtained otherwise), a conclusion that is in line
with the intuition behind our shaky bidding story.
Columns (2) and (4) perform the same analysis but with reference to those bidders who
placed two identical bids only occasionally, i.e., in fewer than 7 periods. Notice that, in this
subsample, the variables that capture mis-coordination in the previous period are no longer
significant; instead, Value is highly significant and negative. One possible interpretation of
this result is that this subsample does not capture genuinely shaky bidding behavior, but
rather, it actually involves equilibrium bidders who place a common bid in the two auctions
simply because they have a low valuation.18
Are assumptions (A1) and (A2) reasonable and realistic? It turns out that three simple
and popular hypotheses proposed by the literature on experimental auctions, although based
on different behavioral motives, do indeed satisfy both assumptions: risk aversion, joy of
winning and loser’s regret.19
Risk aversion.20 (A1) A higher bid increases the probability of winning the object and
thus insures the bidder herself against the possibility of losing. For a risk averse bidder, this
insurance effect is valuable while it is valueless for a risk neutral one. As a consequence, the
ratio between the marginal benefit of a higher bid and its marginal cost is, ceteris paribus,
18An anonymous referee has proposed the Quantal Response Equilibrium (QRE) has an alternative behav-
ioral assumption to account for the observed difference between 1A2U and 2A1U. In fact, despite the fact
that 1A2U and 2A1U are equivalent in the Nash Equilibrium, out-of-equilibrium payoffs differ across these
treatments and this may lead to different QRE. In particular, the coordination risk characterizing 2A1U would
reflect large payoff losses associated with mis-coordinated outcomes, justifying the larger probability of playing
the conservative zero-spread strategy. We recognize the sensibleness of this intuition; unfortunately, due to
the large dimensionality of our experimental setting, fitting a QRE model to our data is technically unfeasible.
We thus keep this idea as a potential subject for future research. It is worth noticing that the QRE concept is
a completely different behavioral hypothesis with respect to our shaky bidding story (assumption A3). While
QRE keeps the equilibrium condition but relaxes the rationality assumption by admitting that players may
play also suboptimal strategies, assumption (A3) retains rationality (shaky bidders do best respond to their
beliefs) but relaxes the equilibrium condition (shaky bidders’ beliefs, though sensible, are incorrect). Notice
also that the evidence presented in Table 8, which, in our view, sheds light on the motives underlying shaky
bidding behavior, would hardly be reconciled with a pure QRE hypothesis.
19For a formal discussion, see the Supplementary Material, where we characterize equilibrium bids under risk
aversion, joy of winning and loser’s regret. We also provide empirical insight on the relevance of the hypothesis
of risk aversion and joy of winning/loser’s regret by combining subjects’ bids with the information collected
through the post-experiment questionnaire. Results show that the proportions of subjects that either reported
to be risk averse or gave importance to winning increase with overbidding, thus confirming that the behavioral
hypothesis considered may indeed be relevant.
20The vast experimental literature on auctions (for an overview, see Kagel 1995; Kagel and Levin 2011)
shows that risk aversion is undoubtedly an important factor in explaining deviations from the theoretical RN
equilibrium; at the same time, it is clear that other behavioral elements may play a role. Kirchkamp et al.
(2010), using a novel experimental design that manipulates bidders’ risk preferences through the number of
income-relevant auctions, show that risk preferences explain overbidding by about 50%.
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greater for the former. (A2) Risk aversion implies that the utility function is strictly concave;
hence, in the allotment treatments, for equal bids, the marginal utility of winning an additional
second unit is strictly lower than the marginal utility from winning the first unit.
Joy of winning. The joy of winning hypothesis states that bidders get a positive benefit
from the mere fact of winning.21 (A1) For a bidder who enjoys winning, the actual benefit
from winning any item is greater than the simple difference between value and bid as it
incorporates the extra-benefit from winning. Hence, with respect to a risk neutral bidder,
the marginal benefit of a higher bid is larger. (A2) In the allotment treatments, if the extra-
benefit from winning is decreasing in successive units (see Grimm and Engelmann 2005), the
actual value that a bidder attaches to the first unit is higher than the actual value of the
second.22
Loser’s regret. Loser’s regret (or missed-opportunity-to-win regret) is based on the idea
that a losing bidder who discovers that the winning bid was indeed below her valuation for
the good will realize that she could have won the auction at a profitable price and thus will
regret not having bid higher.23 (A1) For a bidder with loser’s regret, the actual benefit from
winning any item is greater than the simple difference between value and bid as it avoids the
loss of utility (regret) possibly associated with losing. Hence, with respect to a risk neutral
bidder, the marginal benefit of a higher bid is larger. (A2) In the allotment treatments, it
is reasonable to assume that the regret associated with missing the opportunity to win one
unit is larger when no other unit has been won than when another unit has been obtained
anyway. In this case, the marginal benefit from winning the second unit would be lower, since
a second unit can be won only when a first unit has already been won.24
Clearly, the three behavioral hypothesis considered above are not the only ones who fit
assumptions (A1) and (A2). Consider, for example, social preferences in the form of fairness
and inequity aversion (Fehr and Schmidt 1999; Bolton and Ockenfels 2000). For a bidder
who is inequity averse, in the allotment treatments winning one unit only would minimize the
utility loss caused by an unfair outcome; hence, the marginal utility from winning would be
21Cox et al. (1988), Goeree et al. (2002), Grimm and Engelmann (2005), Cooper and Fang (2008), among
others, argue that joy of winning may explain deviations from the RN equilibrium in experimental auctions.
Joy of winning has also found increasing support from recent studies in neuroscience and psychology, according
to which placing subjects into competitive environments can trigger a desire to win (see Delgado et al. 2008,
and Malhotra 2010, both adopting an auction setup). In the literature, joy of winning has sometimes been
modeled as a fixed extra-benefit that, upon winning the auction, adds to the difference between value and
price (see, e.g., Cooper and Fang 2008, and Roider and Schmitz 2012), sometimes as a bonus proportional
to the value of the object won (see Grimm and Engelmann 2005). In the Supplementary Material, where we
formally analyze a joy of winning model, we follow the former, more popular, modeling strategy.
22Notice that, even though in our 2A1U, two auctions take place, they are run simultaneously: hence, a
bidder views them as a single auction game where two units are sold. Notice also that assuming that, within
an auction game where two units are sold, the joy of winning is decreasing in successive units, does not imply
that it decreases from one auction game to the next. Rather, our idea is that, when a bidder enters a new
auction game, the extra-value of winning jumps back to the initial value, even though that bidder won some
units in the previous periods.
23Engelbrecht-Wiggans and Katok (2008, 2009) and Filiz-Ozbay and Ozbay (2007) show that loser’s regret
induce bidders to overbid to prevent regret in case they do not win the auction. Recently, Roider and Schmitz
(2012) show that joy of winning and loser’s regret (which they call “disutility of losing”) together are able to
rationalize much of the existing experimental evidence on single-unit auctions.
24The literature has identified a second type of regret in auctions, called winner’s (or money-left-on-the-
table) regret: this occurs when the winner in an auction realizes he could have won anyway with a lower bid.
Notice that this second type of regret does not fit into the class of preferences identified by assumptions (A1)
and (A2) as it surely violates the first.
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strictly decreasing in successive units (assumption (A2)). Moreover, if the utility loss associ-
ated with an unfair outcome is larger when the individual is behind than when she is ahead,
a higher bid would, ceteris paribus, be associated with a larger marginal benefit/marginal
cost ratio than under risk neutrality as it reduces the probability of suffering the (largest)
efficiency loss associated with winning nothing (assumption (A1)). Similarly, consider pref-
erences characterized by loss aversion with reference dependence and suppose, in the spirit
of Ko¨szegi and Rabin (2006), that the reference point reflects an expectation of the bidder
about the likely outcome of the auction. In the allotment treatments, where two units are
sold, a bidder could reasonably expect to part with the auction with one unit. But then,
again, the marginal utility from winning the first unit would be larger than the second as it
would avoid losses (assumption (A2)). Moreover, if the bidder expects to obtain an “average”
win also in 1A1U, a higher bid would, ceteris paribus, be associated with a larger marginal
benefit/marginal cost ratio than under risk neutrality as it reduces the probability of suffering
a loss (assumption (A1)).25
It might be questioned whether risk aversion, joy of winning and loser’s regret, which
are indeed credible explanations within the lab, are still relevant in real-world large-stake
auctions, like those for the sale of high-valued assets (licenses, treasury bills) or for the
procurement of works. That even firms may display a risk averse behavior has been shown
empirically by Athey and Levin (2001) in an auction setting and by Kawasaki and McMillan
(1987), Asanuma and Kikutani (1992), Yun (1999) in subcontracting relations. In a recent
experimental paper, List and Mason (2011) show that CEOs exhibit risk aversion.
As far as joy of winning and loser’s regret is concerned, one should abstract away from
their literal meaning and interpret these hypothesis in light of assumptions (A1) and (A2)
above. These two conditions, applied to joy of winning and loser’s regret, can be rephrased
as follows: (A1) there is a latent factor which, upon winning the auction, increases the actual
payoff of a bidder (beyond the simple difference between value and price) or, upon losing the
auction, generates a strictly negative payoff; (A2) when the auction involves multiple units,
the marginal relevance of this factor decreases in the number of units obtained by the bidder.
In light of this more general interpretation, we can imagine several unobservable factors that
may have the above effects also in large-stake real world auctions. For example, winning
a license or obtaining an important procurement contract may have a positive reputation
effect on the firm, that can translate into higher profits in the future or in other markets
in which the firm is operating. Also, it can increase the bargaining power of the firm or
generating a learning by doing effect or increase the probability of accessing to future business
opportunities. Similarly, losing a procurement contract may generate (opportunity) costs in
terms of excess capacity. These effects are likely to become less relevant as more and more
licenses/contracts are obtained by the firm.
6 Conclusion
Although economists and practitioners have long recognized the pro-entry effects of allotment
in auctions, how bidders actually respond to the presence of multiple units remains a not fully
25We thank two anonymous referees for pointing out these two additional behavioral hypothesis. In the
Supplementary Material, we formally show that simple models incorporating these hypothesis generate the
same predictions as those obtained under joy of winning and loser’s regret. Notice, however, that, if the
bidder’s reference point were the status quo, loss aversion would never bite and assumptions (A1) and (A2)
would not be satisfied.
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addressed question.
This paper reports results from a laboratory experiment designed to shed light on the
effects of allotment – moving from a single-unit to multiple-unit auctions – on bidders’ behav-
ior, efficiency and revenue. To this end, we compared three treatments: a first-price auction
in which two units are sold as a single bundle; a two-unit discriminatory auction; two simulta-
neous first-price single-unit auctions. The experiment has been designed so that the standard
theory of risk neutral bidders gives the same equilibrium predictions in the three treatments:
allotment (and the allotment format chosen) should play no role.
Our main result is, however, that allotment in the form of a discriminatory auction pro-
duces, relative to bundling, a substantial loss in efficiency and revenue. This effect has to
be ascribed to a persistent tendency of subjects to place different bids for the two units auc-
tioned. This tendency is prevalent also when the two units are sold through simultaneous
auctions; however, in this format, a significant fraction of bidders makes the same bid in the
two auctions, and this reduces the efficiency loss relative to the bundle auction.
Our experimental results strongly reject the prediction of perfect equivalence of the three
treatments implied by the standard model of Nash Equilibrium with risk neutral bidders.
By simply extending the risk neutrality hypothesis in two respects – namely that (i) bidders
gain a benefit from winning the auction on top of the assigned monetary values, and (ii) this
benefit decreases with the number of units acquired – and by identifying a rational but non-
equilibrium response by bidders to the coordination problem arising when two simultaneous
auctions are run in parallel, we were able to successfully rationalize our experimental evi-
dence. Interestingly, we identified three popular behavioral explanations – risk aversion, joy
of winning and loser’s regret – that are built on these general features of bidders’ preferences;
disentangling across such alternative behavioral explanations surely represents a promising
field for future research.
The interpretation of our results in terms of general preference features provides relevant
insight that can be extended to other market design settings. In particular, one of the main
implications of these features is that allotment uncovers a tendency of bidders to differentiate
their bids, making it possible an outcome in which the units are split across bidders. In
settings, like ours, where this outcome is not desirable, auction formats that inhibit the
possibility (e.g., a bundle auction) or limit the successfulness (e.g., running simultaneous
auctions) of a bid spread strategy are preferable. When, instead, a splitted allocation of the
units across bidders is to be pursued, the choice of the market designer should favor those
formats (e.g., a discriminatory auction) that support the tendency of differentiating bids.
Consider, for example, a situation in which valuations are strictly decreasing. In this case,
splitting units across bidders is often the efficient allocation. This outcome is prevented in a
bundle auction and, therefore, a discriminatory auction would be preferable. However, under
risk neutrality, even the discriminatory auction is not fully efficient, as the difference between
the bids placed by a bidder is smaller than the difference between the corresponding valuations
(see Engelbrecht-Wiggans and Kahn 1998b); in other words, there is less bid spread than it is
optimal. The tendency of differentiating bids identified in this paper should amplify the spread
with respect to risk neutrality, thus making the discriminatory auction very close to achieve
full efficiency. Investigating different market settings would represent a natural strategy to
test the validity of our preference-based explanation of bidders’ response to allotment.
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A Figures and Tables
Table 1. Relative efficiency: summary statistics
RE RAR RBS
1A1U 0.979 0.737 0.241
(0.046) (0.123) (0.133)
1A2U 0.957 0.700 0.257
(0.054) (0.092) (0.112)
2A1U 0.975 0.716 0.256
(0.041) (0.097) (0.102)
Obs. 405 405 405
Notes. This table reports summary statistics (mean and - in
parentheses - standard deviations) at the rematching group
level in the three treatments.
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Table 2. Relative efficiency in 1A1U, 1A2U and 2A1U
RE RAR RBS
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
1A2U &2A1U −0.013∗∗ −0.029 0.012
(0.006) (0.018) (0.018)
1A2U −0.022∗∗∗ −0.037∗ 0.016
(0.006) (0.022) (0.021)
2A1U −0.004 −0.021 0.008
(0.006) (0.021) (0.021)
Period 0.002∗∗∗ 0.002∗∗∗ −0.005∗∗∗ −0.005∗∗∗ −0.006∗∗∗ −0.006∗∗∗
(0.001) (0.001) (7.3 ∗ 10−4) (7.3 ∗ 10−4) (8.0 ∗ 10−4) (8.0 ∗ 10−4)
Constant 0.968∗∗∗ 0.968∗∗∗ 0.768∗∗∗ 0.768∗∗∗ 0.211∗∗∗ 0.212∗∗∗
(0.006) (0.006) (0.016) (0.016) (0.016) (0.016)
Wald− χ2 12.70 22.17 54.93 55.10 55.15 55.32
p > χ2 0.002 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000
Obs. 405 405 405 405 405 405
Notes. This table reports coefficient estimates from GLS models - with weights in columns (3 - 6) -
that include random effects at the rematching group level. The dependent variable in columns (1)
and (2), is the mean of the relative efficiency of the rematching group in the period. The dependent
variable in columns (3) and (4), is the mean of the relative auctioneer’s revenue of the rematching
group in the period. The dependent variable in columns (5) and (6), is the mean of the relative
bidders’ surplus of the rematching group in the period. Period is a linear time trend that starts from
0 in the first period of the experiment. 1A2U and 2A1U are treatment dummies. 1A2U &2A1U is a
dummy that takes value of 1 if the treatment is either 1A2U or 2A1U.
27
Figure 1 – (Sum of the) bids in 1A1U, 1A2U and 2A1U.
Figure 2 – Bid spread in 1A2U and 2A1U.
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Table 3. Probability of overbidding in 1A1U, 1A2U and 2A1U
1A1U 1A2U 2A1U Pooled
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5)
Value 0.001∗∗∗ 0.001 0.001∗∗∗ 0.001∗∗∗ 0.001∗∗∗
(1.8 · 10−4) (0.001) (1.8 · 10−4) (2.2 · 10−4) (2.2 · 10−4)
Period −0.002 1.7 · 10−4 −0.003 −0.002 −0.002
(0.003) (0.004) (0.002) (0.002)
1A2U &2A1U −0.076∗∗∗
(0.028)
1A2U −0.109∗∗∗
(0.032)
2A1U −0.062
(0.046)
lpl −245.882 −407.405 −350.385 −1016.305 −1013.195
Wald− χ2 41.42 2.92 61.14 36.22 46.69
p > χ2 0.000 0.232 0.000 0.000 0.000
Obs. 810 810 810 2430 2430
Notes. This table reports probit marginal effect estimates (robust standard errors clustered
at the rematching group level in parentheses) over all periods. Columns (1)-(3) consider
the three treatments, separately. Regressions in columns (4) and (5) are based on pooled
data. The dependent variable is a dummy that takes a value of 1 if the (sum of the)
bid(s) of the subject in the period is associated with over-bidding. Value is the (sum of
the) private value(s) assigned to the subject in the period. Period is a linear time trend
that starts from 0 in the first period of the experiment. 1A2U and 2A1U are treatment
dummies. 1A2U &2A1U is a dummy that takes value of 1 if the treatment is either 1A2U
or 2A1U. Estimates remain unchanged when Period is excluded from the regressions.
Significance levels are denoted as follows: ∗ : p < 0.1; ∗∗ : p < 0.05; ∗∗∗ : p < 0.01.
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Table 4. (Sum of the) Bids in 1A1U, 1A2U and 2A1U
1A1U 1A2U 2A1U Pooled
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5)
Value 0.681∗∗∗ 0.633∗∗∗ 0.659∗∗∗ 0.658∗∗∗ 0.658∗∗∗
(0.009) (0.010) (0.009) (0.005) (0.005)
Period −0.494∗∗∗ −0.640∗∗∗ −0.800∗∗∗ −0.649∗∗∗ −0.649∗∗∗
(0.117) (0.135) (0.111) (0.070) (0.070)
1A2U &2A1U −4.367∗∗∗
(2.120)
1A2U −5.128∗∗
(2.478)
2A1U −3.606
(2.479)
Constant 7.689∗∗∗ 8.496∗∗∗ 8.423∗∗∗ 11.145∗∗∗ 11.141∗∗∗
(2.248) (2.316) (2.180) (1.884) (1.904)
lrl −3361.717 −3488.945 −3333.645 −10208.017 −10206.006
Wald− χ2 6014.09 3784.23 5430.88 14722.16 14721.77
p > χ2 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000
Obs. 810 810 810 2430 2430
Notes. This table reports coefficient estimates (standard errors in parentheses) from two-
way linear random effects models over all periods accounting for both potential individual
dependency over repetitions and dependency within rematching group. The dependent
variable is the (the sum of the) bid(s) placed by the subject in the period. The other
remarks of Table 3 apply.
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Table 5. Bid spread in 1A2U and 2A1U
1A2U 2A1U Pooled
Size Prob. Size Prob. Size Prob.
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
Value 0.071∗∗∗ 0.002∗∗∗ 0.068∗∗∗ 0.003∗∗∗ 0.070∗∗∗ 0.002∗∗∗
(0.004) (2.6 · 10−4) (0.004) (3.5 · 10−4) (0.003) (2.1 · 10−4)
Period 0.055∗∗∗ 0.007∗∗∗ 0.117∗∗∗ 0.008∗∗∗ 0.086∗∗∗ 0.007∗∗∗
(0.049) (0.003) (0.050) (0.003) (0.035) (0.002)
2A1U −0.101 −0.084∗∗
(0.794) (0.036)
Constant 0.096 −0.215 −0.012
(0.726) (0.853) (0.663)
lrl (lpl) −2653.633 −314.564 −2678.307 −401.947 −5327.147 −716.958
Wald− χ2 367.03 27.59 294.99 109.54 659.62 96.19
p > χ2 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000
Obs. 810 810 810 810 1620 1620
Notes. Columns (1), (3) and (5) report coefficient estimates (standard errors in parentheses) from
two-way linear random effects models over all periods accounting for both potential individual
dependency over repetitions and dependency within rematching group. The dependent variable in
these regression is the absolute value of the difference of the two bids placed by the subject in the
period. Columns (2), (4) and (5) report Probit marginal effect estimates (robust standard errors
clustered at the rematching group level in parentheses) over all periods. The dependent variable is
a dummy that takes a value of 1 if the subject places two different bids in the period. The other
remarks of Table 3 apply.
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Table 6. Highest and lowest bids in 1A2U and 2A1U
1A2U 2A1U Pooled
Highest Lowest Highest Lowest Highest Lowest
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
Value (1 unit) 0.704∗∗∗ 0.562∗∗∗ 0.728∗∗∗ 0.592∗∗∗ 0.715∗∗∗ 0.576∗∗∗
(0.011) (0.011) (0.009) (0.010) (0.007) (0.008)
Period −0.292∗∗∗ −0.348∗∗∗ −0.342∗∗∗ −0.459∗∗∗ −0.317∗∗∗ −0.403∗∗∗
(0.069) (0.074) (0.057) (0.064) (0.045) (0.049)
2A1U 0.683 0.785
(1.206) (1.401)
Constant 4.304∗∗∗ 4.195∗∗∗ 4.110∗∗∗ 4.311∗∗∗ 3.885∗∗∗ 3.887∗∗∗
(1.133) (1.289) (1.071) (1.309) (0.973) (1.116)
lrl −2945.333 −3006.303 −2795.9459 −2891.461 −5752.116 −5903.973
Wald− χ2 4444.91 2475.37 6213.57 3261.75 10314.65 5610.32
p > χ2 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000
Obs. 810 810 810 810 1620 1620
Notes. This table reports report coefficient estimates (standard errors in parentheses) from both
two-way linear random effects model over all periods accounting for both potential individual
dependency over repetitions and dependency within rematching group. The dependent variable in
columns (1), (3) and (5) is the highest bid of the subject in the period. The dependent variable in
columns (2), (4) and (6) is the lowest bid of the subject in the period. Value (1 unit) refers to the
private value assigned to one unit, only. All other remarks of Table 3 apply.
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Table 7. Bid spread and efficiency
Sum of Bids RAR RE
1A2U 2A1U
(1) (2) (3) (4)
Spread dummy 1.297 −2.545∗
(1.921) (1.409)
1A2U −0.010 0.001
(0.026) (0.011)
2A1U 0.019 −0.004
(0.026) (0.010)
1A2U*Spread avg −0.004∗∗ −0.003∗∗
(0.002) (0.001)
2A1U*Spread avg −0.005∗∗∗ −0.45 ∗ 10−4
(0.002) (0.001)
Value 0.631∗∗∗ 0.666∗∗∗
(0.011) (0.010)
Period −0.649∗∗∗ −0.783∗∗∗ −0.005∗∗∗ 0.002∗∗∗
(0.136) (0.111) (0.001) (0.001)
Constant 7.684∗∗∗ 9.596∗∗∗ 0.768∗∗∗ 0.968∗∗∗
(2.611) (2.266) (0.016) (0.006)
lrl −3487.146 −3330.756
Wald− χ2 3782.20 5453.32 66.47 31.27
p > χ2 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000
Obs. 810 810 405 405
Notes. Columns (1) and (2) perform the same econometric approach as in Table 2 to
analyze the determinants of the sum of the bids in 1A2U and 2A1U. Column (3) and
(4) perform the same econometric approach as in Table 5 to analyze the determinants
of relative auctioneer’s revenue and relative efficiency in the three treatments. Spread
dummy is a dummy that takes value equal to 1 if the subject places two different bids
in the period. 1A2U*Spread avg (2A1U*Spread avg ) is the interaction between 1A2U
(2A1U ) and the average spread of the rematching group in the period. All other remarks
of Table 2 and Table 5 apply.
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Table 8. Shaky bidding and mis-coordination in 2A1U
(1) (2) (3) (4)
0-spr. ≥ 7 0-spr. < 7 0-spr. ≥ 7 0-spr. < 7
Value −0.001∗ −0.001∗∗∗ −0.001∗ −0.001∗∗∗
(0.001) (2.4 ∗ 10−4) (0.001) (2.3 ∗ 10−4)
Period 0.009∗∗ −0.002 0.009∗∗ −0.002
(0.004) (0.002) (0.004) (0.002)
Mis-coord(t-1) 0.199∗∗∗ 0.030
(0.060) (0.033)
Mis-coord(t-1)*lost both(t-1) 0.368∗∗∗ 0.001
(0.104) (0.048)
Mis-coord(t-1)*won at least one(t-1) 0.053 0.055
(0.136) (0.034)
lpl −70.075 −159.369 −69.039 −158.411
Wald− χ2 21.50 24.54 41.21 31.30
p > χ2 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000
Obs. 168 588 168 588
Notes. This table reports probit marginal effect estimates (robust standard errors clustered at
the rematching group level in parentheses) over all periods to analyze the determinants of zero-
spread bidding in 2A1U. The dependent variable is a dummy that equals 1 if (i) that bidder
made zero-spread bids in period t, and (ii) that bidder made bid spread in period t-1. Mis-
coord(t-1) is a dummy that equals 1 if, in period t-1, (i) that bidder and her opponent made
bid spread, but (ii) they mis-coordinated their bids. Mis-coord(t-1)*lost both(t-1) (Mis-coord(t-
1)*won at least one(t-1)) is obtained by interacting Mis-coord(t-1) with a dummy that equals
1 if, in period t-1, that bidder lost both items (won at least one item). Regressions reported
in columns (1) and (3) (columns (2) and (4) are performed on the subsample of subjects who
made zero-spread bids in at least (less than) 7 periods. All other remarks of Table 3 apply.
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